Semiosis and meaning are functions of attention. This article presents in broad outline elements of the Greater Attention System, a model argued to be at the heart of how we construct meaning. The model of attention outlined here consists of three interrelated sub-systems: the signal system, the selection system, and the interpersonal system. These three systems consist of eight elements, with altering and orienting of the signal system, detecting sustaining and controlling of the selection system, and sharing harmonizing and directing of the interpersonal system. I argue that the attention and semiosis conspire to construct meaningful scenes and scenarios (also known as mental spaces), whether hypostatic (what is), hypothetical (what if), or hypotyposic (as if). The author's recent visit to the Frick Gallery in New York City offers an "auto-ethnographic" case study as the basis for exploring the role attention plays in meaning making. The text here is excerpted from chapter two of the author's forthcoming book, From Attention to Meaning: Explorations in Semiotics, Linguistics, and Rhetoric. 
Introduction
Our topic begins with a curious experience that happened as I toured the famous Frick Gallery on East 70 th Street overlooking Fifth Avenue and Central Park in New York City. As I entered the Living Hall (a room at the center of the Gallen' paneled in oak housing some of Henry Clay Frick's most famous acquisitions) and as I oriented myself toward the fireplace, I took notice of three paintings: El Greco's portrait of St. Jermone (circa 1590) hanging direcdy above the fireplace mantel flanked by a portrait of Sir Thomas More (1527) to the left and Thomas Cromwell (1532) to the right, both creations of Hans Holbein, the Younger. The portrait of More (famous for its trompe l'oeil effect) presents the subject in a three-quarter view facing left, while the portrait of Cromwell presents the subject in a more severe profile facing right. Gazing out from the center of the room listening intently to the "ArtPhone Commentar}" about each portrait, I experience the odd feeling that Thomas Cromwell was staring at Thomas More, as if he were plotting against him, such animosity no doubt prompted bv the commentator's disclosure that Cromwell was More's arch political enemy and partly responsible for his execution in 1535. Although gazing in Cromwell's general direction, More seemed unaware of his arch enemy's presence. It seemed as though Cromwell had More right where he wanted him! This odd feeling was not mine alone, as my companion, standing next to me and listening to the same commentary, remarked that "Cromwell is staring at More". We both thought that Frick probably savored the irony of this hang. 1 As strange as this feeling might seem, it is an absolutely normal occurrence based on the workaday cognitive operations, namely the ability to construct on the fly mental simulations from disparate conceptual domains, in this case from the domains of artistic portraiture, curatorial practices, and political infighting.
Understanding why and how such effects occur is the subject of this essay.
This curious experience evidences a prime instance of human beings forging dramatic meanings from static images by "blending" things that do not normally go together; hence, it is an example of semiotic blending, the general model of human meaning construction adopted here. But most fundamentally, this curious incident is important for what it says about human attention. As an activity it enables the opportunity to present the elements of the greater attention system, for the ability to attend is the sine qua non of human meaning construction. The term attention pops up repeatedly in discussions of meaning, but its presence has been mentioned more than understood. I present the greater attention system as a heuristic on which to build theories of semiotics. I do not claim to present the grand unified theory of meaning, but only to project a rough sketch of what the sciences of meaning could look like as a consequence of attending to attention.
Semiotics
What is semiotic sì Semiotics is the study of signs produced intentionally by human beings and taken by other human beings as expressions of their producers' conscious 1 The living hall is the only room left unchanged since Frick's death. mental states and communicative intentions. 2 Most generally, semiotics is the term given in the European context for the study of meaning as it relates to any and all cultural phenomena. There is a basic notion that meaning is the product of signification, and that signification operates across multiple sign systems. Therefore, capturing the structure and logic of those systems as manifest in the products of meaning (i.e., literary texts, cinema, paintings, cartoons, music, etc.) is the domain of semiotics. The general logic of signs pursued in this study is that they present us with a mental resonance of the "remembered present" that helps us attend to the here-and-now as suggesting to us what is the case. Signs disclose to us hypostatic scenarios. They likewise give us the means of elaborating on presentations through imaginative variations that reference the there-andthen, allowing past and future variable aspects of this presentation, aspects that could change, and suggesting to us what would happen if such-and-such were the case. Signs disclose to us hypothetical scenarios. Sign also provide us with the means of enacting hypostatic and hypothetical scenarios as-if they were unfolding in the present moment -the experience of the interacting Holbein portraits being a juicy example. Signs disclose to us hypotyponc (or fictive) scenarios. Such is the general logic of signification pursued in this article. However, before beginning an investigation, it is necessary to orient the systematic perspective developed here to other known systematic perspectives in semiotics.
Five theoreticalperspectives: overview and assessment 3 The epistemologica! perspective. Signs may be regarded as making knowledge and reasoning possible, because it is through signs that we are able to refer to "things" in a world, be they real or imagined, past, present or future, possible or impossible. Signs allow us to make generalizations and abstractions about the world and about each other. We think in signs. This epistemic and logical perspective is most identified with Charles Sanders .
The cultural linguistic perspective. Signs may be studied as manifestations of culture and its conventions. Signs are codes conveying messages among members of a community; we use signs to share experiences. Language is the prototypical sign system and thus provides the basis for studying most if not all other sign systems, such as those comprising architecture, film, music, and painting, to name a few prominent examples. The cultural linguistic perspective is most identified with Ferdinand de Saussure (1972 Saussure ( [1913 ), but more specifically with the structural semiotics of Louis Hjelmslev (1961 [1943] ).
Other prominent cultural linguistic semioticians include Algirdas Julien Greimas (1966) and the work of Roman Jakobson from his Prague School years : 1920-1939 (1971 [1932] ). An offshoot of the cultural linguistic perspective is the radical postmodern perspective. This perspective founds itself on the axiom, "All signs are in fact 'empty' of meaning". Meaning is no longer possible, if it ever was. Radical postmodernists reject the very notion that there is any relationship between the signifier and signified (Saussure's terms for the sign vehicle and its meaning); reality is a welter of signifiers that "simulate" the real or the true. 4 The work of Jean Baudrillard (1983; 1990) is the apotheosis of the carnival of signs as selfgenerating signifiers.
The behavioristperspective. Signs may be theorized in terms of the reflex arcs of stimulus and response. Signs are at base ways of directing and conditioning behavior. A sign appears and we respond to it in a predictable way, leading to new signs and sign relations. In this respect signs are "preparatory stimuli" influencing the reactions to other stimuli in other situations, and thus processes of signification can be empirically observed and classified to "behaviorfamilies". The behaviorist perspective is most identified with Charles Morris (1946) , a follower of Peirce and George Herbert Mead.
The bio-anthropological perspective. Signs may be studied as adaptations, behavioral routines that emerge from the interaction of an organism with its environment. Organisms build models of reality as a basic survival tactic. In the human context, representations are constitutive of all experience, especially communication. Biologists, neuroscientists, evolutionary anthropologists, and evolutionary psychologists can be placed within this tradition of inquiry (even those who would abjure the title, "semiotician"), as they define sign relations as comprising an organism's umwelt, or subject-world. The bio-anthropological perspective is most identified with the ethological theory of Jakob von Uexküll (1956 [1937] ), and with the philosophical anthropology of Ernst Cassirer (1944) , for whom symbolic forms are to be understood as collective coping devices.
The phenomenological perspective. Signs may be studies as the constituents of conscious experience, particularly from the first-person perspective. Under this view, signs are the entities enabling the appearance of things, our intuitions of their meanings as they bear on perception, thought, memory, imagination, desire, and volition. In addition, the phenomenological perspective accord special attention to bodily awareness and action as the basis of social and linguistic action. The philosophical progenitors of this perspective include Edmund Husserl (2001 [1901] ) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1996 [1945 ).
A general theory of semiotics based on attention fits within a cognitive perspective in which signs are to be understood as the basis for "higher-order" human cognition responsible for abstract reasoning, architecture, language, institutions, laws, music, visual arts -cultural practices writ large. My colleague Per Aage Brandt (2004) is a principal advocate of this theoretical perspective.
The general theory of an attention semiotic intersects with the other five perspectives in specific ways, and it is now onto the task of relating it to them.
An attention semiotic intersects with the Epistemological perspective in three ways. First, it sees all reasoning as fundamentally semiotic, and thus semiotics should be seen not as a discipline but as a field housing many simplified models. It is foundational in the sense that all other modes of philosophical inquiry depend on it. Second, it takes from this perspective the basic tenet that signs function along three dimensions (described below). Third, it treats, iconicity (i.e., similarity with the thing it represents) as the most fundamental sign relation in the human context. Icons (discussed below) engender what Peirce terms "diagrammatic representations", which for him underlie all abstract forms of reasoning. Thinking issues from diagrams, for it is through these skeletal representations that human beings can "experiment" and in so doing deduce and later induce evidence (CP 1931: 4. §351-367) . 5 In its broadest formulation, the Epistemic perspective aligns itself with the tripartite attention system outlined below insofar as human signification operates across a material domain of signals, a mental domain of the selection, sustain, and control of thought, and the interpersonal domain of calibrating and communicating thoughts among agents.
An attention semiotic intersects with the Behavioral perspective only to the extent that it gives due attention to the signal system as amenable to empirical observation. Patterns of alerting and orienting are indeed capable of being empirically studied by experimental and observational methods. Behaviorism as a doctrine, however, does not fit easily into a cognitive semiotic approach, given the large role introspection plays in the latter. For partisans of the former perspective, introspection is the enemy of good science, whereas for partisans of the present perspective, introspection is a necessary and desirable, if fallible, mode of investigation.
An attention semiotic intersects with the Cultural Linguistic perspective in the prominent place it affords conventions -sign relations based on common interpersonal agreement, language being a preeminent example. Culture is not, as some evolutionary psychologists seem to imply, a thin veneer atop innate processes and dispositions. Culture and cognition are deeply intertwined. What is more, cultural patterns form more or less stable structures permitting meaning to arise. The attention semiotic takes from this tradition Hjelmslev's (1943) interpretation of the sign as consisting along two axes of expression-form and content-form and expression-substance and content-substance. The principal contribution of these Hjelmslevian distinctions permits semioticians to extract interpersonally meaningful and communicative structure from its more accidental properties. In short, a semiotics of attention has to account for the differences that make a difference. Categorical intuitions depend on distinguishing content from form and substance and expression from form and substance. The study of signs as structured systems of cultural conventions has been pioneering in this respect, so much so that much contemporary linguistic theory is founded upon it.
My initial instinct is to dismiss out of hand the radical postmodernist perspective, for the simple reason that it is not really a theory or method at all. The postmodernist critique of the "economy of signs" is a normative rather than descriptive enterprise. 6 As such it is a form of critique that produces ever more hyperbolic claims and counterclaims. Still, the radical postmodernist do offer a global insight (dare I say "truth") pertinent to any contemporary semiotic theory. Much of the world is awash in signs. We westerners in particular dwell in iconically, indexically, and symbolically saturated landscapes, so saturated that it would probably be incomprehensible to the likes of Aristode, St. Augustine or Erasmus and vertiginous to the likes of Locke, Hobbes, or even Peirce and Saussure. The radical postmodernists point this out more forcefully than do partisans of the other perspectives. The lesson I take from this fact is the polar opposite of theirs, however. The need is not for critique (understood as resistance) -however acutely I and others may feel the need to distance my being from the things signs are doing to me -but for better theories of how we attend, perceive, remember, learn, and act in these semiotically dense environments.
An attention semiotic intersects with the Bio-Anthropological perspective in one important respect. As van Heusden rightly points out, the bioanthropological perspective is "the only perspective that takes the emergence of signs[...] into account" (2004: 4). In other words, the other perspectives take for granted the existence of signs and sign processes, hence begging the question, "How did signification arise in the first place?". Van Heusden himself identifies memory as the origin of human signification, for memory provides two elements that are the building blocks of all sign relations: 1) a recognized pattern and 2) an object that is recognized in terms of that pattern at the same time that it is taken to be different from it. These two elements interact as a memory, and it is through memory that we relate them (2004: 9). I am generally sympathetic to this line of reasoning but would add, of course, the idea that memory works within the larger context of attention; hence, the present general theory has manifold implications for theories of the origin of human signification. Though questions concerning the phylogeny and ontogeny of signs and symbols is of immense importance and will be indirectly broached in these explorations, for the goal of this study is narrower: to refine semiotic, linguistic, and rhetorical analysis by bringing those analyses into alignment with a model of human attention.
Perhaps the perspective most tightly aligned with an attention semiotic is one given to us through Phenomenology. How and why we attend; the consequences of how and why we attend; and how and why we become conscious of some things rather than others is the project of phenomenology, particularly that of Merleau-Ponty, who regards language and other expressive signs systems as emerging from and circulating back into the body-as-subject (1955: 175) . Accordingly, the five senses that acquaint us with our own bodily states, physical and mental, likewise acquaint us with the physical and mental states of other bodies. The signs human bodies produce form the building blocks of conscious experience, and it is through conscious experience that meanings become meaningful to us. In this respect, the phenomenological perspective is woven through the greater attention system: our bodies are sensitive to specific kinds of signals, which in turn define the spectrum of detecting, sustaining, and controlling attention. And perhaps most importanti}' of all, the phenomenology of perception helps us build third-person perspectives that lead to expressive routines for sharing and harmonizing attention with others and for directing the attention of others.
An attention semiotic sits comfortably with epistemology, phenomenology, and cultural linguistics as a theory and method of semiotic analysis. It shares much with evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and anthropology insofar as it regards questions of the origin and development of sign relations as paramount research problems and would seek to influence research in some directions (attention and memory research) over others (positing yet more innate mental modules). It does not sit comfortably with the behaviorists (but neither do many contemporary semiotic theories for that matter) for narrow methodological reasons, and it is a real party-pooper among the radical postmodernists.
It is one thing to place the present theory within the larger field of semiotics and quite another to describe how it operates as a theory, our next topic.
The Greater Attention System as Semiotic
Three Dimensions of the Sign: Presentation; Representation; Interpretation A sign is anything that stands for something to someone. The process of signification (or "semiosis" in the literature) then comprehends a tripartite relationship in which, as Peirce characterizes it, a Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interprétant, into relation to the same Object (CP 1931:1. §92 ).
This definition stands in contrast to Saussure's dyadic doctrine of signified and signifier, whereby a barking sound (signifier) elicits the idea of a dog (signified) in one's mind. For Peirce the critical point is that the sound does elicit the category DOG but also the object to which the sign refers -signs are always grounded: something that functions as a sign is always manifest in something that is not in itself a sign. Peirce's semiotics, pace the Saussure's, emphasizes the embodied and grounded nature of signification and that the sign vehicle (or "representamen" as he calls it) can be manifest in a great variety of substances, really anything detectable by human sense-perception. It likewise emphasizes the communal nature of signification, as all thinking involves signs, and what renders signs adaptive is their "testimonial" quality; we can learn that something is the case by displaced signification, obviating the need to experience it firsthand (EP 1992: 19-20) .
The theory of signs inspired by Peirce and outlined here starts from the idea that signification operates along three dimensions: the presentation dimension of the sign vehicle·, the representation dimension of the sign object·, and the interpretation dimension of sign affect. Together these three dimensions of the sign comprise the semiotic substrate for building hypostatic, hypothetic, and hypotyposic scenarios.
There is a logical alignment among the triadic dimensions of the sign and the three systems of attention. Sign vehicles are materially grounded in signals of various stripes, the only necessary qualification being that the signal be detectable. That a certain arrangement of line and color on a two-dimension plane come to signify something to someone from a particular vantage point is a reliable means of alerting and orienting attention.
Sign objects are selected for conscious awareness and can remain in conscious awareness through continued signification, sustainable exogenously and endogenously. For instance, detecting the two Holbein portraits referenced above can lead to sustaining attention, such that all modes of signals subsequently detected are interpreted in relation to a nexus of related sign objects, such as the portraits themselves, the persons represented therein, and the manner in which each historical portrait is displayed. Controlling attention fits within the Peirce's doctrine as well, for it is possible for human beings to divide attention between unrelated objects and to oscillate among the dimensions of the same or related objects. In the former instance, the museum patron's attention switches between the Holbein portraits and his companion's dining suggestions. In the latter instance, his attention can oscillate attention between the historical objects of Holbein's artistry and his artistry itself and between the historical objects of that artistry and Frick's imputed intentions in displaying that artistry.
The interprétant of a sign refers to its influence on interpreters/ All signs are signs for somebody in some context; hence, the interpersonal nature of signification aligns with the interpersonal system of attention, such that signs emerge from sharing, harmonizing, and directing attention. Awareness of the presence of others, of a shared existence, is a necessary condition of meaning making for what should be obvious reasons. If I can use something to stand for something else, then that same vehicle-object relation can be replicated by someone else. What makes semiosis metaphysically fundamental, according to Peirce, is that it makes culture possible. In this context, cultures are conglomerations of communally shared vehicle-object relations. They are a form of "currency" in an inter-mental exchange, with meaning as the harmonized object of that exchange.
The three museum patrons harmonized to the two Holbein portraits as representing real historical beings oriented to one another in a dramatically meaningful way. This means that the three patrons understand that portraits are meaningful, i.e., bear specific sign relations, because they each "gaze at" their viewers -a manner of address, if you will. Thomas More appears to be looking off into the distance completely unaware of his viewers; whereas Thomas Cromwell appears to be looking somewhere else entirely, equally unaware of his viewers. There are also layers of agency significant here. Holbein is the artistic agent who brings into existence of the two portraits. It is his actions with paint that bring about a Thomas More oriented toward the viewer's right and a Thomas Cromwell oriented toward the viewer's left. In this sense, the interprétant of the vehicle-object relations are of persons looking in one direction or the other. We feel that Holbein intended viewers to regard each thusly; he is directing our attention to particular kinds of interprétant. At a subsequent layer of signification, the interprétant of these two vehicle-object relations are not only persons looking in one direction then another, but of two persons looking in different directions at the same time, signifying different objects of attention. This mode of signification is not to be regarded as a function of Holbein's agency but as a function of Frick's agency. It is he who is directing our attention to a particular kind of interprétant: one person gazing at the other person, the latter being unaware of the former's gaze.
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Interprétants are not to be identified with interpreters. Interprétants entail the existence of interpreters, but the effects they produce are stable among the community of sign users. Their influences are socially real and distributed among semiotic agents.
The logical alignment of the signal, selection, and interpersonal attention systems with the presentation, representation, and interpretation dimensions of the sign is thus my proposal for founding a theory of signs in human cognition, and it is a natural alignment if one considers attention the sine qua non of higher order cognition with sign action defined in terms of altering, orienting, detecting, sustaining, controlling, and above all, sharing, harmonizing, and directing attention for specific expressive purposes.
Before exploring further, I wish to insist on two characterizations of the attention system as semiotic. First, it is non-linear; second, it is recursive. There is a dynamic-looping relationship between the signal system and the other attention systems. While there may be many facets of signals invariant across cultures, the role a specific signal plays and the manner in which persons orient attention to them varies greatly. The way human beings organize interpersonal existence has tremendous bearing on what counts as a sign vehicle. East Asians urbanités live in a denser environment than do their West European and American counterparts, that has an significant effect on how each of them orient objects and relations in the environment. A similar feedback loop emerges from the different kinds of interpersonal engagements and patterns that have developed among these people, further influencing what counts as a meaningful signal. Investigating in fiali the cultural effects of attention to vehicle-object relations is well beyond the scope of the present study; I simply wish to note the semiotics of attention discussed here assumes non-linear influences among the three systems.
The systems non-linear influence means that it is also recursive: vehicleobject relations build on each other in such a way that the circumambient vehicle-object relation comprehends a more basic vehicle object relation. A representation becomes a presentation of another representation at a more comprehensive layer of interpretation. For instance, the vehicle-object relation between globs of paint and a human figure can betoken a specific person (e.g., Thomas Cromwell). The object of the first vehicle then becomes the vehicle for another object, for instance a type of office holder (e.g., Chancellor of the Exchequer of English 1533-1534) when comprehended at the level of historical discourse. It is therefore possible to look at Holbein's portrait of Thomas Cromwell and remark, "The Ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer looks tired and angry".
Nine Functions of the Sign
Three sets of three sign functions specify the three dimensions of signification and correspond to Peirce's own taxonomy. 8 A sign can function in three modes of presentation: quality, existence, and convention. First, something becomes a sign of something else because it possesses sensory qualities that make it a good indicator of that something else. Specific colors and their saturations are sign vehicles because they match the qualities of the intended object: methods of combining red, yellow, and blue, tinted with white or shaded with black produce skin tone colors, each of which chosen for its qualitative match with the intended object. Second, something becomes a sign of something else because it appears existentially with that something else. An obvious example is smoke. A less obvious example might be a grimace, since the grimace is taken as coextensive with a particular emotion or feeling, such as pain. Third, something becomes a sign of something else because it possesses a conventional or law-like signifying relation. The principal reason a letter combination signifies a concept is through an agreed upon or legislated convention. Some of these conventional relationships are motivated by qualitative or existential considerations while others are purely arbitrary.
A sign functions in three modes of representation: icon, index, and symbol? First, a sign directs attention to something else because it bears some (however slight) resemblance of that something else. Holbein's portraits are obvious examples of iconic signs that form "likenesses". The stick figures on traffic signs are likewise icons of persons crossing streets, for instance. In both cases, their iconicity signifies the possibility of existence or appearing. The traffic sign depicting a human figure crossing the street means, "It is possible that pedestrians may be crossing the street", this without committing to any actual occurrence at any given moment. The Holbein portraits mean, "There is a person who looks like this, even though he is not here in the flesh". Icons are the basic type of representation, for human beings are especially apt at relating one thing to another based on similarity. Second, a sign directs attention to something else because it bears some causal or contiguous relation to that something else. In this manner, the two Holbein portraits point to the existence of real people. They mean, "This person is Thomas More, the author of the political treatise Utopid\ More fancifully, Cromwell's pose indexes More if one views his gaze as "pointing" at the portrait of More across the room. Third, a sign directs attention to something else because it bears some conventional or agreed-upon relation to something else. The name Hans Holbein bears an identity relation to a person because the conventional relationship between specific combinations of letters and sound has evolved into an agreed upon method of detecting conspecifics among Homo sapiens sapiens. A less obvious but no less pertinent example is the convention of exhibiting portraits. Proper museal convention holds that portraits are to face toward the center of the room. If for no other reason, Frick placed the Cromwell portrait to the left and More to the right of the fireplace in order to ensure the viewer's line of sight complied with this conventional rule.
A sign functions in three modes of interpretation: association, designation, argumentation. First, a sign comes to mean something because it initiates a chain of associations based on sparse or vague presentations. The mere mention of the name "Frick" can elicit associations of the industrial revolution, the Robber Barons, privilege, philanthropy, and patronage in the minds of those familiar with American history. Second, a sign comes to mean something because it designates something else, as in "This portrait left of the fireplace". Third, a sign comes to mean something because it predicates something to something else. The clause, "Henry Clay Frick is a clever art collector", functions as an argumentative sign. Argumentation builds on designation and association.
The table below presents an at-a-glance breakdown of the nine functions of the sign. Table 1 To complete an exploration of the nine functions of the sign, let us consider briefly a humorous headline from the April 21st, 1999 edition of the satirical newspaper, The Onion. It reads:
(1) Neighbors confront alcoholic child abuser about his lawn.
The headline epitomizes a story of misplaced attention, selecting as its satirical object the suburbanite's concern for aesthetics over ethics. The humor arises from attention to an inverted value hierarchy: it is better to be concerned with appearances than with conduct. A semiouc beginning is, of course, to acknowledge that the headline itself is a set of conventional and symbolic functions that are typically set very early on by the reader's interpersonal tunings of the signal system. It is perhaps too obvious to be point out that such a conceit can be articulated with similar effect in French, (la) Les voisins critiquent un alcoholique maltraiteur d'enfant au sujet de sa pelouse, or in Danish,
(1 b) Naboer kritiserer en alkobolisk bernemishandlers misligholdelse af sin gmsploene. The signal system captures the phonological and orthographical substantiation of these symbols, which in turn are forms aligned with semantic content analyzable into words and phrases. A phrasal analysis of the English headline will capture attentional structures of these sign functions. The selection system captures regularities of the iconic and indexical functions of these conventional signs, while the interpersonal system captures regularities of their association, designation, and argumentation functions to provide a semiotized analysis of its meaning.
Take the subject, "neighbors". The semantics of neighbors selects for a range of potential meanings. The meaning potential of this form can be something like "persons living in close proximity to other persons", and "persons caring about the welfare of others living close by", or "persons caring about the condition of their immediate environment". As such, the sign indexes a type of person and, as such, elicits attention to a field of associations. That would be all if the subject remained a subject. In isolation, the expression merely detects a category of being, allowing the mind to associate freely, enriching imagery through sustained effort or disengaging attention in favor of something else. But the conventional nature of the sign vehicles allows for systematic constraining of signification. Lexical and grammatical forms channel meaning through predication, a linearization of form and content.
The verb "confront" indexes a type of transitive action of a semantic agent directly at or on a semantic counter agent (literally in the accusative case). The next noun is the direct object specifying the counter agent, such that attention goes directly to a designation -a particular value of the category NEIGHBOR. This designation, however, indexes another designation, for the same value is simultaneously a NEIGHBOR, an ALCOHOLIC, and a CHILD ABUSER, and these categorical predications are taken as necessarily true. At this point, it is semiotically pertinent to point out that some linguists (viz., Haiman 1985) see the syntax of subject-verb-direct object as iconic, whereby the conventional linearization captures the temporal qualities of the representation itself -the flow of grammar matches the flow of event. The act of confronting is likewise semantically unconstrained without a designation. The final designation is the category LANDSCAPE. The logic of confrontation is that there is a point of conflict between the semiotic agents about some object. The argumentation is the implication that the semiotic counter agent is a bad neighbor, based on the generalization that "a resident who neglects his lawn violates the norms of neighborliness". (In fact, the literal meaning of the Danish participle misligholdelse is "to violate or fail to uphold a contract", thereby direcdy lexicalizing the ethical associations only implicit in the English version.) The embedded argument, that the welfare of the person's children is of no real concern to the neighborhood, remains conspicuous. It is these two scenarios presented for consideration that leads to a satirical meaning, a kind of attention in which the neighbors witness the parent breaking the law but only in order to identify him as the owner of their real topics of concern: lawns and their property values.
F rick j· Conceit and the Attention Semiotic
Frick's conceit, as I fancy calling it, can be understood as a lamination of three semiotic layers. The first later corresponds to the vehicle of paint in which emerges an iconic resemblance to its object, in this case the living person, Sir Thomas More in 1527. At this layer, Hans Holbein is the existent sign for the appearance of oil paint on canvas, the specific colors of which were chosen as sign vehicles based on their qualities -one color mimics the quality of Caucasian skin another the sumptuous textures of his garments. These colors and textures conspire to form a densely iconic representation of this historical figure. Add to this, the convention of a three-quarter pose that signals a familiar and agreed-upon means of representing someone's likeness. Of course, the painting can only stand in iconic relation to Sir Thomas More in relation to the designating function of the interprétant. Unmoored from this designation, the portrait merely represents, in the words of my teenage son, "some old dude".
The second layer produces a similar set of qualitative, existent, and conventional modes of presentation for realizing iconic and indexical representations of its object -in this case, of the living human being, Thomas Cromwell in 1539. (Sir Thomas More is now dead.) Similar unmoored, this portrait represents the icon of "some really old guy". Both these semiotic layers present to us what is the case.
It is the third semiotic layer that elicits the much discussed and strange incident of the staring portrait. The sign vehicle is now the distribution of the two Holbein portraits within a spatial context. The qualitative functions of their In this diagrammatic dispensation, the grounding space represents the space of signification. The situational relevance established in the grounding space gives us what Peirce calls the "immediate interprétant". That is to say, the semiotic processes described above purportedly describe how patrons go from sign vehicles to interpersonali}' shared meaning at the moments following the encounters with Holbein's portraits in Frick's former living room. The immediate interprétant corresponds to the shared attentional field of an art gallery; thus everything presented to the patron is understood to take on a particular kind of contextual relevance. The presentation space encompasses meanings associated with the arrangement of sign vehicles. The relationship between paint and figure is iconic, an iconici tv of strong resemblance; the relationship between figure of the portrait to the left and figure of the portrait to the right is similarly iconic, but this rime an iconicity based on remembered patterns of human interaction, such that we attributed an attentional disposition to the figure to our left as directed at something beyond us, and we attribute an attentional disposition to the figure on our right as directed at the figure to our left. In Peirce's terminology, the contents of this mental space function as a "dynamic object" -an efficient cause of the representation.
The reference space, in contrast, encompasses meanings associated with Thomas Cromwell and Thomas More as historical and political figures in Tudor England. 11 The relationships between the paint on canvas, the names on the placards, and the subjects of the curator's commentary are all broadly indexical. In this mental space, Thomas More and Thomas Cromwell coexisted for a time as influential members of the Court of Henry VIII; they had both enjoyed positions of political and economic power; and they both had a particular kind of relationship. Each figure from the presentation space maps onto a type of person in the reference space: "political rival". The interprétant that emerges in this encounter is the argument: "these two figures hated each other". In Peirce's terminology, the contents of this mental space operate as "the immediate object -the object represented by the sign vehicle.
The Virtual space is the space in which iconic representations indexing the past impose their presence on the museum patron, such that the existent fact of the two portraits being displayed in the same room elicits a hypotyposic meaning. This space is stabilized by an "immediate interprétant" -Peirce's term for the immediately grasped intuition that the one figure in the portrait was (impossibly but nonetheless compellingly) staring at the other figure in the portrait: diegesis emerging from stasis.
The subsequent development of the Virtual space may be glossed as interpersonally shared manifestations of Peirce's dynamic and final interprétants. 12 The three patrons can focus on the arrangement itself as a clever means of directing their attention and can oscillate between Frick's imputed "dramaturgical" prowess in arranging it thus, and the dramatis personae in this story of internecine political struggles during the reign of King Henry VIII (among other possibilities). In so doing, they oscillate between the dynamic interprétant -in this instance, admiring the way the collector is affecting our minds -and the final interprétant -in this instance, the meaning of this encounter -Frick's clever trick of bringing the story of political rivalry vividly to life -after "sufficient development of thought" (EP1992: 2.482).
Synopsis: Signs and the Greater Attention System
The presentation, representation, and interpretation dimensions of the sign provide a useful way of understanding the role of attention in meaningful communication: alerting and orienting correspond to moments when we make ourselves prone to experience the presentation of a kind of signal or sign vehicle. Detecting corresponds to the moment when a presentation acquires its object via an interprétant. Sustaining corresponds to the moment when signification acquires other significations at different layers of analysis, as when globs of paint conspire to represent a person which, in turn, comes to represent a historical figure from Tudor England. Controlling corresponds to the moments when the interpreter disengages from one vehicle-object relation or complex of relations to attend to another vehicle-object relation. Sharing, harmonising, and directing correspond to the interpretation dimension insofar as any vehicle-object relation is a representation for someone for some purpose in some socialpragmatic context. 
